Colloquium: "The Paradox of Literalism as a Figure in Law and Religion" by Calum Matheson

Speaking figuratively usually means hoping that one’s speech is interpreted as figurative. The exact boundaries of rhetoric have been disputed for millennia, but it seems that we can agree on this least common denominator: rhetoric is about what is figurative, not what is literal. I propose to upset this compromise by examining the insistence on literalism as a kind of trope. This linguistic operation is ancient but increasingly momentous. Conspiracy theorists, white supremacists, religious fundamentalists, police, and legal scholars all use versions of this tactic, albeit in very different ways. I use two examples: serpent-handling Pentecostal churches that rely on a literal reading of Mark 16:17-18, and agents of the judicial system who fix the meaning of speech selectively, usually to the disadvantage of Black subjects of the law. The first demonstrates what Jacques Lacan would describe as a psychotic or purely metonymic reading in which signifiers are deeply meaningful in and of themselves, with no possibility of ambiguity. The second demonstrates literalism as a selectively deployed weapon of language, animated by cynicism rather than conviction despite its formal similarity to psychotic readings. These two readings form a set of four (along with metaphor and irony) that I intend to examine in a larger book project. Attendees should read a precirculated paper that will be made available via the Humanities Center Google Drive two weeks ahead of the colloquium.